RHETORIC. A lost work of Aristotle is quoted by Diogenes Laertius (viii. 57) as saying that Empedocles " invented " (evpelv) rhetoric ; Zeno, dialectic. This is certainly not to be understood as meaning that Empedocles composed the first " art" of rhetoric. It is rather to be explained by Aristotle's own remark, cited by Laertius from another lost treatise, that Empedocles was " a master of expression and skilled in the use of metaphor "—quali-ties which may have found scope in his political oratory, when, after the fall of Thrasyclseus in 472 B.C., he opposed the restoration of a tyranny at Agrigentum. The founder of rhetoric as an art was Corax of Syracuse (c. 466 B.C.). In 466 Thrasybulus the despot of Syracuse was

Early overtnrown, and a democracy was established. One of Greek the immediate consequences was a mass of litigation on —Corax cla'ms t° property, urged by democratic exiles who had ' been dispossessed by Thrasybulus, Hiero, or Gelo. If, twenty years after the Cromwellian settlement of Ireland, an opportunity had been afforded to aggrieved persons for contesting every possession taken under that settlement in the ten counties, such persons being required to plead by their own mouths, the demand for an " art" of forensic rhetoric in Ireland would have been similar to that which existed in Sicily at the moment when Corax appeared. If we would understand the history of Greek rhetoric before Aristotle, we must always remember these circum-stances of its origin. The new " art" was primarily intended to help the plain citizen who had to speak before a court of law. "Ten years ago," a Syracusan might urge, " Hieron banished me from Syracuse because I was suspected of popular sympathies, and gave my house on the Epipolae to his favourite Agathocles, who still enjoys it. I now ask the people to restore it." Claims of this type would be frequent. Such a claim, going many years back, would often require that a complicated series of details should be stated and arranged. It would also, in many instances, lack documentary support, and rely chiefly on inferential reasoning. The facts known as to the " art" of Corax perfectly agree with these conditions. He gave rules for arrangement, dividing the speech into five parts,—proem, narrative, arguments (dySycs), sub-sidiary remarks (rape/c/JaoTs), and peroration. Next he The illustrated the topic of general probability (EIKO'S), showing topic of its two-edged use : e.g., if a puny man is accused of assault-ers. jng a strongerj kg can gay; « js jt lively that I should
have attacked him?" If vice versa, the strong man can argue, " Is it likely that I should have committed an assault where the presumption was sure to be against me?" This topic of CIKOS, in its manifold forms, was in fact the great weapon of the earliest Greek rhetoric. It
Tisias. was further developed by Tisias, the pupil of Corax, as we see from Plato's Pkxdrus, in an " art" of rhetoric which antiquity possessed, but of which we know little else. Aristotle gives the «KOS a place among the topics of the fallacious enthymeme which he enumerates in Ehet. ii. 24, remarking that it was the very essence of the treatise of Corax, and points out the fallacy of omitting to distin-guish between abstract and particular probability, quoting the verses of Agatho,—" Perhaps one might call this very thing a probability, that many improbable things will
Gorgias. happen to men." Gorgias of Leontini, who visited Athens as an envoy from his fellow-citizens in 427 B.C., captivated the Athenians by his oratory, which, so far as the only considerable fragment warrants a judgment, was characterized by florid antithesis. But he has no definite place in the development of rhetoric as a system. It is doubtful whether he left a written "art"; and his mode of teaching was based on learning prepared passages by heart,—diction (Aefis), not invention or arrangement, being his great object.
The first extant Greek author who combined the theory
Anti- with the practice of rhetoric is the Athenian Antiphon,
phon. the first on the list of the Attic orators. His works belong to the period from 421 to 411 B.C. Among them are the three " tetralogies." Each tetralogy is a group of four speeches, supposed to be spoken in a trial for homicide. Antiphon was the earliest repre-sentative at Athens of a new profession created by the new art of rhetoric—that of the Xoyoypa^os or writer of forensic speeches for other men to speak in court. The plain man who had not mastered the newly invented weapons of speech was glad to have the aid of an expert. The tetralogies show us the art of rhetoric in its transi-tion from the technical to the practical stage, from the school to the law-court and the assembly. The four skeleton speeches of each tetralogy are ordered as follows: —A, the accuser states his charge; B, the accused makes his defence ; C, the accuser replies; D, the accused rejoins to the reply. The imaginary case is in each instance sketched as slightly as possible; all details are omitted; only the framework for discussion is supplied. The organic lines of the rhetorical pleader's thought stand out in bold relief, and we are enabled to form a clear notion of the logographer's method. We find a striking illustra-tion of the fact noticed above, that the topic of "pro-bability," so largely used by Corax and Tisias, is the staple of this early forensic rhetoric. Viewed generally, the works of Antiphon are of great interest for the history of Attic prose, as marking how far it had then been influ-enced by a theory of style. The movement of Antiphon's prose has a certain grave dignity, "impressing by its weight and grandeur," as a Greek critic in the Augustan age says, " not charming by its life and flow." Verbal antithesis is used, not in a diffuse or florid way, but with a certain sledge-hammer force, as sometimes in the speeches of Thucydides. The imagery, too, though bold, is not florid. The structure of the periods is still crude; and the general effect of the whole, though often powerful and impressive, is somewhat rigid.
As Antiphon represents what was afterwards named the "austere" or "rugged" style (avarr-qpa appovia), so Lysias was the model of an artistic and versatile sim-plicity. But the tetralogies give Antiphon a place in the history of rhetoric as an art, while Lysias, with all his more attractive gifts, belongs only to the history of oratory. Ancient writers quote an " art" of rhetoric by Isocrates, but its authenticity was questioned. It is certain, however, that Isocrates taught the art as such. Isocrates. He is said to have defined rhetoric " as the science of persuasion" (hvurTTjp.y]v 7r<ri0oOs, Sextus Empir., Adv. Mathem., ii. § 62, p. 301 sq.). Many of his particular precepts, both on arrangement and on diction, are cited, but do not suffice to give us a complete view of his method. The (f>i\ocro<pia, or "theory of culture," which Iso-crates expounds in his discourses " Against the Sophists " and on the "Antidosis," was in fact rhetoric applied to politics. First came technical expositions : the pupil was introduced to all the artificial resources which prose com-position employs (ras iSeas cuma-as ats 6 Aoyos Tuy^avti XP<o/«vos, Antid., § 183). The same term (iSccu) is also used by Isocrates in a narrower sense, with reference to the " figures" of rhetoric, properly called o-xwa-ra (Panath., § 2); sometimes, again, in a sense still more general, to the several branches or styles of literary com-position {Antid., § 11). When the technical elements of the subject had been learned, the pupil was required to apply abstract rules in actual composition, and his essay was revised by the master. Isocrates was unquestionably successful in forming speakers and writers. This is proved by the renown of his school daring a period of some fifty years, from about 390 to 340 B.C. Among the states-men whom it could claim were Timotheus, Leodamas of Acharnae, Lycurgus, and Hyperides. Among the philosophers or rhetoricians were Speusippus, Plato's suc-cessor in the Academy, and Isaeus ; among the historians, Ephorus and Theopompus.
In the person of Isocrates the art of rhetoric is thus thoroughly established, not merely as a technical method, but also as a practical discipline of life. If Plato's mildly ironical reference in the Euthydemus to a critic " on the borderland between philosophy and statesmanship " was meant, as is probable, for Isocrates, at least there was a wide difference between the measure of acceptance

accorded to the earlier Sophists, such as Protagoras, and the influence which the school of Isocrates exerted through the men whom it had trained. Rhetoric had won its place in education. It kept that place, through varying for-tunes, to the fall of the Roman empire, and resumed it, for a while, at the revival of learning. Aris- Aristotle's Rhetoric belongs to the generation after *°*lu s , Isocrates, having been composed between 330 and 322 e one BC ^g controversial allusions sometimes hint, it holds Isocrates for one of the foremost exponents of the subject. From a merely literary point of view, Aristotle's Rhetoric (with the partial exception of book iii.) is one of the driest works in the world. From the historical or scientific point of view, it is one of the most curious and the most interesting. If we would seize the true significance of the treatise, it is better to compare rhetoric with grammar than with its obvious analogue, logic. A method of grammar was the conception of the Alexandrian age, which had lying before it the standard masterpieces of Greek literature, and deduced the " rules " of grammar from the actual practice of the best writers. Aristotle, in the latter years of the 4th century B.C., held the same position relatively to the monuments of Greek oratory which the Alexandrian methodizers of grammar held rela-tively to Greek literature at large. Abundant materials lay before him, illustrating, in the greatest variety of forms, how speakers had been able to persuade the reason or to move the feelings. From this mass of material, said Aristotle, let us try to generalize. Let us deduce rules, by applying which a speaker shall always be able to per-suade the reason or to move the feelings. And, when we have got our rules, let us digest them into an intelligent method, and so construct a true art. Aristotle's practical purpose was undoubtedly real. If we are to make persua-sive speakers, he believed, this is the only sound way to set about it. But, for us moderns, the enduring interest of his Rhetoric is mainly retrospective. It attracts us as a feat in analysis by an acute mind—a feat highly character-istic of that mind itself, and at the same time strikingly illustrative of the field over which the materials have been gathered.
Analysis. Rhetoric is properly an art. This is the proposition from Book I. which Aristotle sets out. It is so because, when a speaker persuades, it is possible to find out why he succeeds in doing so. Rhetoric is, in fact, the popular branch of logic. Now hitherto, Aristotle says, the essence of rhetoric has been neglected for the accidents. Writers on rhetoric have hitherto concerned themselves mainly with "the exciting of prejudice, of pity, of anger, and such-like emotions of the soul." All this is very well, but "it has nothing to do with the matter in hand; it has regard to the judge." The true aim should be to prove your point, or seem to prove it.
Here we may venture to interpolate a comment which lias a general bearing on Aristotle's Rhetoric. It is quite true that, if we start from the conception of rhetoric as a branch of logic, the phantom of logic in rhetoric claims precedence over appeals to passion. But Aristotle docs not sufficiently regard the question— What, as a matter of experience, is most persuasive ? The phantom of logic may be more persuasive with the more select hearers of rhetoric ; but rhetoric is not for the more select; it is for the many, and with the many appeals to passion will sometimes, perhaps usually, be more effective than the semblance of the syllogism. And here we seem to touch the basis of the whole practical vice—it was not strictly a theoretical vice—in the old world's view of rhetoric, which, after Aristotle's day, was ultimately Aristotelian. No formulation of rhetoric can corre-spond with fact which does not leave it absolutely to the genius of the speaker whether reasoning (or its phantom) is to be what Aristotle calls it, the "body of proof" (aHp-a iriareas), or whether the stress of persuading effort should not be rather addressed to the emotions of the hearers. This is a matter of tact, of instinct, of oratorical genius.
But we can entirely agree with Aristotle in his next remark, which is historical in its nature. The deliberative branch of rhe-toric had hitherto been postponed, he observes, to the forensic. We have already seen the primary cause of this, namely, that the very origin of rhetoric in Hellas was forensic. The most urgent need which the citizen felt for this art was not when he had to discuss the interests of the city, but when he had tc defend (perhaps) his own property or his own life. The relative subordination of deliberative rhetoric, however unscientific, had thus been human. Aristotle's next statement, that the master of logic will be the master of rhetoric, is a truism if we concede the essential primacy of the logical element in rhetoric. Otherwise it is a paradox; and it is not in accord with experience, which teaches that speakers incapable of showing even the ghost of an argument have sometimes been the most completely successful in carrying great audiences along with them. Aristotle never assumes that the hearers of his rhetorician are as oi xapieiH-es, the cultivated few; on the other hand, he is apt to assume tacitly—and here his individual bent comes out—that these hearers are not the great surging crowd, the bx^-os, but a body of persons with a decided, though imperfectly developed, preference for sound logic.
What is the use of an art of rhetoric ? It is fourfold, Aristotle Uses of replies. Rhetoric is useful, first of all, because truth and justice rhetoric, are naturally stronger than their opposites. When awards are not duly given, truth and justice must have been worsted by their own fault. This is worth correcting. Rhetoric is then (1) corrective. Next, it is (2) instructive, as a popular vehicle of persuasion for persons who could not be reached by the severer methods of strict logic. Then it is (3) suggestive. Logic and rhetoric are the two impartial arts ; that is to say, it is a matter of indifference to them, as arts, whether the conclusion which they draw in any given case is affirmative or negative. Suppose that I am going to plead a cause, and have a sincere conviction that I am on the right side. The art of rhetoric will suggest to me what might be urged on the other side; and this will give me a stronger grasp of the whole situation. Lastly, rhetoric is (4) defensive. Mental effort is more distinctive of man than bodily effort; and "it would be absurd that, while incapacity for physical self-defence is a reproach, incapacity for mental defence should be no reproach." Rhetoric, then, is corrective, instructive, suggestive, defensive. But what if it be urged that this art may be abused ? The objection, Aristotle answers, applies to all good things, except virtue, and especially to the most useful things. Men may abuse strength, health, wealth, generalship.
The function of the medical art is not necessarily to cure, but to make such progress towards a cure as each case may admit. Similarly it would be inaccurate to say that the function of rhetoric was to persuade. Rather must rhetoric be defined as "the faculty of discerning in every case the available means of persuasion." Suppose that among these means of persuasion is Rhetoric some process of reasoning which the rhetorician himself knows to defined, be unsound. That belongs to the province of rhetoric all the same. In relation to logic, a man is called a " sophist" with regard to his moral purpose (irpoaipems), i.e., if he knowingly uses a fallacious syllogism. But rhetoric takes no account of the moral purpose. It takes account simply of the faculty (SiW/tis) _—the faculty of discovering any means of persuasion.
The "available means of persuasion," universally considered, The may be brought under two classes. (1) First, there are the proofs xio-reis external to the art,—not furnished by rhetoric,—the "inartificial classified, proofs" {&rexvoi iriVreis). Such are the depositions made by witnesses, documents, and the like. (2) Secondly, there are the proofs, i.e., the agents of persuasion, which the art of rhetoric itself provides, the "artificial proofs" (ivrexvoi moreis). These are of three kinds :—(a) logical (KOJIK^I ITIVTIS)—demonstration, or seeming demonstration, by argument; (6) ethical (T/0IK}J TTIO-TLS), when the speaker succeeds in conveying such an impression of his own character as may lead the hearers to put trust in him ; (c) emotional (iradrirncri irians), when the speaker works persuasively on the feelings of the hearers. It follows that, besides logical skill, the rhetorician should possess the power of analysing character, in order to present himself in the ethical light which will be most effective with his audience. He must also under-stand the sources of the emotions, and the means of producing them. Hence rhetoric has a double relationship. While in one aspect—the most important to it as an art—it may be regarded as popular logic, in another aspect it is related to ethics. And hence, says Aristotle, political science (iroXiTin-ii) being a branch of ethical, as the citizen is one aspect of the man, "rhetoric and its professors slip into the garb of political science ({nroSverai TO trxvp-a TO rrjs TrohiTiicris), either through want of education, or from pretentiousness, or from other human causes."
Aristotle now proceeds to analyse the first of the " artificial The proofs," the logical (A071K71 TTIVTIS). Answering to the strict logical syllogism of logic, rhetoric has its popular syllogism, to which proof. Aristotle gives the name of "enthymeme" (ivSifi-nf-")- This term (from the verb hdvpsitrecu, " to revolve in the mind "), means properly " a consideration" or "reflection." It occurs first in Isocrates, who uses it simply of the "thoughts" or "sentiments" with wdiich a rhetorician embellishes his wrork (TO?S iv6v^iip.a<ri irpsirovTws oXov rby \oyov icaTairoiic'iKcu, Or., xiii. § 16). Whether the technical sense was or was not known before Aristotle, it is to

him at least that the first extant definition is due. He defines the The enthymeme as a species of syllogism, namely, as "a syllogism enthy- from probabilities and signs" (e£ elKorai/ Kai arnietwv). The meme. "probability" (ei/cos) is a general proposition, expressing that which usually happens, as, "wise men are usually just." The '' sign " (avf-eTov) is a particular proposition, as, " Socrates is just." The "sign" may be fallible or infallible. If we say, "wise men are just; for Socrates was wise and just," this is an enthymeme from a fallible "sign," the implied syllogism being "Socrates was wise; Socrates was just (a-ripe'Iov) ; .'. all wise men are just"; and here the "sign" is, in Aristotle's phrase, "as a particular to a universal," because from the one case of Socrates we draw an inference about all men. If, again, we say,—"Here is a sign that he is ill —he is feverish " ; our enthymeme is using an infallible sign, the syllogism being, "All who are feverish are ill; he is feverish (atuxiiov); .he is ill." Here, again, the "sign" is "as a particular to a universal." When the " sign" is thus infallible, it is properly called tekmerion (THK^PIOV), the matter having been demonstrated and concluded (TreirepacriJ.ei>ov)—"for tekmar and peras mean the same thing ('limit') in the old language." Sometimes, again, the fallible sign is "as universal to particular," e.g., " Here is a sign that he has a fever —he breathes quick," the syllogism being, "Feverish men breathe quick ; he breathes quick (crrtixetov) ; .'. he has a fever," where a particular cause is unsoundly inferred from an effect (the " universal") which might have other causes.
When Aristotle thus describes the enthymeme, or rhetorical syllogism, as dealing with "probabilities" and "signs," he is describing its ordinary or characteristic materials, qua rhetorical syllogism. He does not mean to say that rhetoric cannot use syllogisms formed with other material. It would be hardly need-ful to point this out, were it not that, in spite of his own clear words, his meaning has sometimes been misunderstood. "The premises of rhetorical syllogisms," he says, "seldom belong to the class of necessary facts. The subject matter of judgments and deliberations is usually contingent; for it is about their actions that men debate and take .thought; but actions are all contingent, no one of them, so to say, being necessary. And results which are merely usual and contingent must be deduced from premises of the same kind, as necessary results from necessary premises. It follows that the propositions from which enthymemes are taken will be sometimes necessarily true, but more often, only contin-gently true." Among the materials of the enthymeme, the " sign " which is infallible (the <r-np.t~Lov which is also a TiKp.i)piov) is so because it is to some necessary truth as part to whole. Suppres- Aristotle did not regard the suppression of one premiss in the sion of statement as essential to the enthymeme. The syllogism, of which one pre- the enthymeme is merely a kind, was regarded by him " not in re-miss not lation to the expression " ( ov irpos TOV £|W Koyov), but to the process essential, in the mind (aWa. irpbs rbv iv rfi i|/ux>? Xoyov, Anal. Post., i. 10).
As Sir W. Hamilton has justly said, he could not then have intended to distinguish a class of syllogisms by a verbal accident. The distinction of the rhetorical syllogism, in Aristotle's view, was in its matter, not in its form. This is, indeed, made sufficiently clear by his own remark that the enthymeme may "often" be more concisely stated than the full, or normal, syllogism (Rhet., i. 2). There is obviously no reason why the rhetorical reasoner should not state both his premisses, if he finds it convenient or effective to do so. Since, however, one of the premisses is often left to be mentally supplied, some of the later writers on rhetoric came to treat this as part of the essence of the enthymeme. It was then that the word areXris was interpolated after <rvX\oyt<r/j.6s in Aristotle, Analyt. Prior., ii. 27, where the enthymeme is defined as ffvXKoyiafxbs e| ziKOTcav KOX crT/^ueiW. Hence Quintilian says of the enthymeme (v. 10), "alii rhetoricum syllogismum, alii imperfectum syllogismum vocant" ; hence, too, Juvenal's '' enrtum enthymema."
The The other branch of the '' logical proof " in rhetoric corresponds
example, to the induction of strict logic, and consists in giving the semblance
of inductive reasoning by the use of one or two well-known
examples. As Aristotle calls the enthymeme a rhetorical syllo-
gism, so he calls the example (irapdSetyixa) '' a rhetorical induction."
Thus if a man has asked for a body-guard, and the speaker wishes
to show that the aim is a tyranny, he may quote the "examples "
of Dionysius and Pisistratus.
The Aristotle next distinguishes the '' universal " from the '' special"
To'iroi, topics, or commonplaces of rhetoric. The word TOVOS, "place," means in this context " that place in which a proposition of a given kind is to be sought." The TOVOI, then, are classifications of propositions and arguments which rhetoric makes beforehand, with a view to readiness in debate. Cicero well illustrates the phrase—"As it is easy to find hidden things when the place has been pointed out and marked, so, when we want to track out an argument, we ought to know the places, as Aristotle has called these seats, abodes, as it were, from which arguments are drawn.
O li I C 511
So a commonplace, or topic, may be defined as the abode of an argument (licet definire locum esse argumenti sedem ; Cic., Topica, ii. 7). So elsewhere he describes the TOTTOV of rhetoric as "regiones intra quas venere et pervestiges quod quseras"— "haunts in which one may hunt and track out the object of quest" (Be Orat., ii. 34). The "universal commonplaces" (itoivol universal TOVOI) are general heads of argument applicable to all subjects and whatsoever—as, e.g., on the "possibility" or "impossibility" of special anything. The special commonplaces (roirot TOW elSuv, llhet., ii. 22, more briefly called eíSn) are those which are drawn from special branches of knowledge, as from politics, ethics, &c. Here Aristotle observes that the more a rhetorician enters on the subject-matter of any particular science the more will he tend to pass out of the domain which properly belongs to the art of rhetoric.
In that domain three provinces are distinguished. Deliber- The three ative rhetoric (<7v/j.l3ov\evTiicT)) is concerned with exhortation or kinds of dissuasion, and with future time; its "end" (TÉXOS)—that which rhetoric, it keeps in view, or its standard—is advantage (or detriment) to the persons addressed. Forensic rhetoric (SIKCU/IKTI) is concerned with accusation or defence, and with time past ; its standard is justice or injustice. Epideictic rhetoric—the ornamental rhetoric of "display" (eViSeiKTiicTJ)—is concerned with praise or blame, and usually with time present ; its standard is honour or shame.
1. Let us begin with deliberative rhetoric, says Aristotle, and see Deliberi
what things a deliberative speaker ought to know. The subjects tive.
with which, in a public assembly, he will have to deal are mainly
these five :—(1) finance, (2) foreign war, (3) home defence, (4) commerce, (5) legislation. Under all these heads, he ought to be provided with some e'lS-n, or special commonplaces. Further, all his suasion or dissuasion has reference to the happiness of those whom he addresses. Hence he must be acquainted with the popular notions of happiness which are actually prevalent. Here Aristotle gives a series of popular definitions of happiness, and a list of the elements which are generally regarded as constituting it. A similar analysis of " good " (àyaflóV) follows.
The scientific spirit of the rhetoric is strongly accentuated by the unscientific character of these and subsequent analyses. Aristotle never forgets that his rhetorician wants to know, not what a thing is, but what it is generally thought to be. There is nothing of cynicism or sarcasm in all this. He is simply going through his prescribed task. He is making rhetoric, as such, into a method. But suppose the question arises—"Of two good things which is the better ?" Our deliberative speaker must be able to treat the "universal commonplace" of degree (¡ictXKov noi 5\TTOV). Then, ho must also know something about the chief forms of government,— democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy,—not as they are or should be, but as they are popularly conceived.
2. The ornamental rhetoric (¿ViSei/cTi/rij), which is taken next, Epideic-
is somewhat briefly dismissed. It might be conjectured, in ex- tic.
planation of its place in the treatment—we should have expected
it to come third—that Aristotle was the first writer who recog-nized it as an independent kind, and that he viewed it as an off-shoot from the deliberative branch. The epideictic speaker must know what most men think "honour" or "shame," "virtue" or " vice. " At this point a verbal distinction of some interest occurs:—praise (eiraivos) implies moral approbation ; but an "en-comium" (eyKtifiiov) is given to " achievements " (epya) as such. The most generally useful " topic " for the ornamental speaker is avenáis (magnifying),—as the rhetorical induction (irapáSeiyfía) most helps the deliberative speaker, and the rhetorical syllogism (eVeó/írum) is most useful to the forensic.
3. In forensic rhetoric, we must begin by analysing injustice. Forensic.
And first, "What are the motives and aims of wrong-doing?"
Actions are either voluntary from habit, reason, anger, lust, or in-
voluntary from chance, nature, force. In reference to the voluntary
actions, it is needful to know the popular conception of pleasure.
Secondly, "What is the character which disposes a man to do wrong,
or which exposes him to suffering it ?" These topics must be familiar, in a popular way, to the forensic speaker. He must also know the general grounds on which actions are classed as just or unjust. Actions must be considered, first, in reference to law, which is either special (ÍSios), whether written or unwritten, the law of particular places and communities, or else universal (KOIVÓS), the law of nature. The second question about an "unjust" action is whether it hurts an individual or the community. The definition of "being wronged" (íSutelaBca) is, "to be unjustly treated by a voluntary agent." Further, the definition of a particular offence (e-niypaiiiia) sometimes raises a legal issue. A man may admit an act, and deny that it corresponds to the description given of it by the accuser. It is needful, then, to know the definitions of the principal crimes. It may be noticed that Aristotle hero anticipates a topic which played a large part in the later rhetoric. The contested issues which he calls a/x(pL<rPnTÍ¡(rets The (Bhet., iii. 16) were the o-rácreis (constitutiones or status) of later "issues." days. Thus the issue as to the proper definition of an offence, to which he refers here (Rhet., i. 13), coincides with the later



Footnotes

On this interpolation, see Sir W. Hamilton's Discussions, p. 154